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This paper evaluates the relevance of the taxation for public spending efficiency in a sample of 
OECD economies in the period 2003-2017. First, we compute the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) scores and the Malmquist productivity index to measure the change in total factor 
productivity, the change in efficiency and the change in technology. Second, we explain these 
newly computed public efficiency scores with tax structures using a reduced-form panel data 
regression specification. Looking at the period between 2007 and 2017, our main findings are as 
follows: inputs could be theoretically lower by approximately 32-34%; the Malmquist indices show 
an overall decrease in technology and in TFP. Crucial for policymaking, we find that expenditure 
efficiency is negatively associated with taxation, more specifically direct and indirect taxes 
negatively affect government efficiency performance, and the same is true for social security 
contributions. 
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A country´s economic performance depends, inter alia, on the efficiency of its public sector. 
In fact, how governments raise and spend revenues affect both the economic and social 
development of countries. Even though governments have alternative sources of funding (e.g. 
transfers from the European Union (EU), in the case of the EU countries, social security 
contributions, and dividends from State Owned Firms), taxation is by far the main revenue source. 
According to ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2018), total tax revenues account for more than 80% of total 
government revenue in about half of the countries in the world, and more than 50% in almost every 
country. On the other hand, previous studies shows that government spending efficiency could be 
improved for OECD countries (see, for instance, Afonso et al., 2005, 2010, Adam et al., 2011, and 
Afonso and Kazemi, 2018). Importantly, one also needs to assess to what extent the specificities 
of a tax system can help, or not, the level of government spending efficiency. That is a topical issue 
that has been also receiving growing attention from academia and policymakers (see, notably, 
Afonso and Schuknecht, 2019). 
In this study, we evaluate to what extent the structure and pattern of a country´s tax system 
are related to public spending efficiency in a sample of 36 advanced OECD economies in the period 
2003-2017. To this end, we employ a two-stage methodology. In the first stage, we compute the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) scores and the Malmquist productivity indices to measure the 
change in total factor productivity, the change in efficiency and the change in technology. We use 
a set of metrics and construct composite indicators to relate outputs to inputs to measure 
government spending.   In the second stage, we empirically evaluate whether the pattern and 
structure of taxes affect these input efficient scores obtained in the first stage, using a reduced-form 




Our results show that: i) input efficiency scores averaged 0.679 in 2003-2007, 0.665 in 
2008-2012 and 0.667 in 2013-2017, implying that inputs could be theoretically lower by around 
32-34%, keeping the same level of output; ii) between 2007 and 2017, there were efficiency gains 
for 47% of the countries; iii) between 2007 and 2017 there were some increases in efficiency, but 
the Malmquist indices show an overall decrease in technology and in TFP; iv) in the second step 
analysis, we find a negative effect of direct taxes on government performance; v) there is also a 
negative and significant effect on social security contributions with a magnitude similar to that of 
direct taxes or non-tax revenues; vi) a negative impact on efficiency from indirect taxes, with a 
higher magnitude than for the other tax items. These results have a direct implication for policy 
making, notably regarding the structure of taxation in place in a given country. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 sets up the efficiency and productivity analysis. 
Section 5 reports the efficiency and tax structure analysis. The last section concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
The measurement of public sector efficiency and its determinants has been the subject of a 
growing literature, including key contributions by Afonso et al. (2005), Gupta and Verhoeven 
(2001) and Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997, 2000). These studies typically measured public sector 
efficiency by relating government expenditures to several socio-economic indicators usually 
targeted by public spending. To assess the efficiency of government spending, these studies 
estimated a non-parametrically production function frontier and derived efficiency scores based on 
the relative distances of inefficient observations from the frontier.1 Although the majority of the 




1 There are several parametric and non-parametric methodologies that have been used to compute technical efficiency. 




studies evaluated the overall efficiency of the services provided by the government, other focused 
on a particular public service, mostly education and health (see e.g. Afonso and Aubyn, 2006). 
Nevertheless, both streams of research suggest substantial efficiency differences between countries 
and possible spending savings for OECD and EU countries (see, notably, Adam at al., 2011, and 
Duti and Sicari, 2016, Afonso and Kazemi, 2017, and Antonelli and de Bonis, 2019) and Latin 
American and Caribbean countries (Afonso et al., 2013). 
Recently, previous studies have begun examining the determinants of these cross-country 
efficiency differences. Since there are naturally exogenous and non-discretionary inputs that are 
contribute to each country’s outputs, the literature several proposals a two-stage models to deal 
with this issue.2 For example, Afonso et al. (2006) concluded that property right security, 
education, income level and civil service competence affect the public sector efficiency in new 
member states of the European Union; Hauner and Kyobe (2008) found that higher government 
efficiency tended to be associated with the income level, the share of transfers to local 
governments, with better governance and with the size of the total government expenditures; and 
Antonelli and de Bonis (2019) add that education, population size, welfare system and corruption 
affect government efficiency. Related to our topic, Chan et al. (2017) find that for a panel of more 
than 100 countries, value-added taxes (VAT) enhances the effect of efficient government spending 
on the economic growth. While the goal of the previous study was to evaluate how government 
spending efficiency affected economic growth, in our study we evaluate the extent to which taxes 
affect government spending efficiency. 




parametric techniques data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull (FDH) have been widely applied in the 
literature. 




3. Methodology    
 3.1 DEA 
 DEA is a non-parametric technique,3 which computes the production frontier for each 
Decision Management Units (DMUs). Therefore, each observation can be compared with an 
optimal outcome. For each DMU, in our case each country i, we consider the following function: 
   = , 	 = 1, … ,   (1) 
where  is the composite output measure and  is the composite input measure, namely government 
spending to GDP ratio.  
If   < , it is said that country i exhibits inefficiency. For the observed input levels, 
the actual output is smaller than the best attainable one and inefficiency is measured by computing 
the distance to the theoretical efficiency frontier.  
 Considering, for the sake of illustration, an input orientation and assuming variable-returns 
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3 DEA is a non-parametric frontier methodology, which draws from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and that was further 
developed by Charnes et al. (1978). Coelli et al. (2002) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer introductions to DEA. 
4 This is the equivalent envelopment form (see Charnes et al., 1978), using the duality property of the multiplier form 




where  is a column vector of outputs,   is a column vector of inputs,   is the efficient scores,  
is a vector of constants, 1’ is a vector of ones,  is the input matrix and  is the output matrix.. In 
this linear problem, we have ! inputs to produce " outputs for  DMUs.   
 In equation (2),  is a scalar (that satisfies 0 ≤   ≤ 1) and measures the technical 
efficiency, the distance between a country and the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear 
combination of the best practice observations. With  < 1, the country is inside the frontier, it is 
inefficient, while  = 1  implies that the country is on the frontier and it is efficient. The vector λ 
measures the weights used to compute the location of an inefficient country if it were to become 
efficient, hence, maximizes productivity. The inefficient country can theoretically be on the 
production frontier as a linear combination of those weights, related to the country-peers of the 
inefficient country. The peers are other DMUs that are more efficient, and used as references for 
the inefficient country.  
 The restriction  1’ = 1 imposes convexity of the frontier, accounting for VRS. Not using 
this restriction would amount to admit that returns to scale were constant and that all countries are 
operated at the optimal scale. VRS scores take into account the fact that countries might not operate 
at the optimal scale.  
 3.2 Malmquist TFPI 
 The production frontier and the efficiency scores usually change over time. Therefore, it 
is important to decompose that variation into changes attributed to efficiency and to the frontier 
changes. The output Malmquist total factor productivity index (Malmquist, 1953), TFP, allows this 
decomposition in an intuitive way.5  For a given country, it is defined as follows: 
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o xyd  is the output distance score using the frontier at year t and inputs and outputs 





















































xyxyTFP          (4) 
or, equivalently,  


























































TC is the technology change index. In a variable returns to 
scale framework as ours, the efficiency change index can be further decomposed into a scale effect 
and a pure efficiency effect. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the concept of Malmquist total factor productivity index. Consider that 
we are evaluating a DMU, a country in our analysis, in two points in time t and t+1. In both periods, 
the DMU production is less than feasible under each production frontier. The Malmquist index 
indicates the potential rise in productivity as the frontier shifts from period t to t+1. The country at 







4. Efficiency and Productivity Analysis 
4.1. Data and Variables  
Our dataset includes 36 OECD member countries6 and it covers three distinct periods: 
2003-2007, 2008-2012 and 2013-2017. We gather data from several sources. Tables A1 and A2 in 
Appendix A provide information on the sources and variable construction.7 
We start by constructing an output composite for  Public Sector Performance (PSP), as 
sugested by Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) for the three periods. These indicator includes 
two main components: opportunity indicators and the traditional Musgravian indicators. The 
opportunity indicators focuses on the role of the government in providing various servides for 
the individuals. These sub-indicators reflect the governments’ performance in four areas, 
administration, education, health and infrastructure. The administration sub-indicator includes: 
corruption, burden of government regulation (red tape), judiciary independence, shadow economy 
and the property rights. To measure the education sub-indicator, we used the secondary school 
enrolment rate, quality of educational system and PISA scores. For the health sub-indicator, we 
compiled data on the infant survival rate, life expectancy and survival rate from cardiovascular, 
cancer, diabetes or chronic respiratory diseases. The infrastructure sub-indicator is measured by 
the quality of overall infrastructure. For each sub.indicator, we computed a 5-year average to 
account for structural changes.8 The Musgravian indicators includes three sub-indicators: 




6 The 36 OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
7 Table A1 lists all sub-indicators to construct the PSP output indicator. Table A2 includes the data on various 
governments’ expenditures area which are used as the input measure.  
8 More specifically, we compute the average for each sub-indicator for the three periods: 2005 and 2011 and for the 




distribution, stability and economic performance. To measure distribution, we used the 5-year 
average of the gini coefficient. For the stability sub-indicator, we used the coefficient of variation 
for the 5-year average of GDP growth and standard deviation of 5 years inflation.  Economic 
performance  includes the 5-year average of GDP per capita, GDP growth and unemployment 
rate. Each sub-indicators is  then normalized by dividing the value of a specific country by the 
average of that measure for all the countries in the sample. This will ensure a convenient benchmark 
for comparing the results.  
[Table 1] 
Table 1 summarizes the variables used to construct the PSP indicators. Each sub-indicator 
of the PSP results from the average of the measures included in each sub-indicator. To compute 
the PSP, we gave equal weights to each sub-indicator of opportunity and Musgravian indicators.  
 
$%$& = ∑ $%$&(
)
(*+       (6) 
where  &  denotes the OCDE countries and  (  is socio-economic indicators. $%$& is overall 
performance of the country &. 
Our input measures include the Public Expenditure (PE) as a percentage of GDP. More 
specifically, we consider the government consumption as the input for administrative performance, 
government expenditure in education as the input for education performance, health expenditure 
as the input for health performance and public investment as the input for the infrastructure 
performance. For the distribution indicator, we consider expenditure on transfers and subsidies as 
the cost affecting the income distribution. The stability and economic performance indicator as 
related to the total expenditure. Then, we equally weigh each area of government expenditure to 





4.2. DEA efficiency scores 
We performed DEA for different models assuming variable returns to scale. We compute 
baseline model (Model 0) with only one input (PE as percentage of GDP) and one output (PSP), as 
a starting point. In this case, the efficient countries are Australia, Ireland, South Korea and Mexico 
(detailed results are in the Table B.0 of Appendix B). Figure 2 illustrates the production possibility 
frontiers for Model 0 for the periods 2003-2007 and 2013-2017. 
[Figure 2] 
Moving forward to the main part of the analysis, Table 2 provides a summary of the DEA 
results for the three periods using input and output-oriented models. The purpose of an input-
oriented assessment is to study by how much input quantities can be proportionally reduced without 
changing the output quantities produced. Alternatively, and by computing output-oriented 
measures, one can assess how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without 
changing the input quantities used.  
Model 1 uses one input, governments’ normalized total spending (PE) and two outputs, the 
opportunity PSP and the “Musgravian” PSP scores. Model 2 assumes two inputs, governments’ 
normalized spending on opportunity and on “Musgravian” indicators and one output, total PSP 
scores. The results obtained from the two models are illustrated on Tables B.1 and B.2 of Appendix 
B. 
[Table 2] 
In our baseline model, Model 0, the input efficiency scores averaged approximately 0.5 for 
the three periods suggesting that inputs could be reduced by approximately 50% in each of the 
periods. The input efficiency scores of Model 1 are larger, averaging 0.679 in 2003-2007, 0.665 in 
2008-2012 and 0.667 in 2013-2017. Therefore, inputs could be theoretically lower by around 32% 




Between 2007 and 2017, there were efficiency gains for 47% of the countries (50% in 2007-2012 
and 42% in 2012.2017). Model 2 provides similar results as Model 1, but the number of countries 
experienced efficiency gains increases. The input efficiency scores average ranged between 0.619 
in 2003-2007, 0.643 in 2008-2012 and 0.674 in 2013-2017, implying that with the same level of 
output, inputs could be theoretically lower by around 38%, 36% and 33%, respectively. In this 
model, 72% of the countries experienced efficiency gains between 2007 and 2017. 
Turning to the output efficiency scores, we find that the average scores of our baseline 
model equaled 1.169, 6.396 and 1.461 for 2003-2007, 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, respectively, For 
Model 1, the average scores equaled 1.102 in 2003-2007, 1.161 in 2008-2012 and 1.159 in 2013-
2017, which means that with the same level of inputs, output could increase by around 9%, 14% 
and 14%, respectively. Model 2’s output efficiency scores averaged 1.163 in 2003-2007, 6.359 in 
2008-2012 and 1.442 in 2013-2017. Note that the results for the second period are affected by 
Greece negative performance on the stability and economic performance sub-indicators. In fact, 
Greece “Musgravian” PSP score is negative.   
Overall, the countries located in the production possibility frontier, hence the more efficient 
ones in terms of government spending, are: Australia (2008-2012), Ireland (2013-2017), South 
Korea (three periods), Latvia (2007) and Mexico (three periods). Ireland is efficient by default.  
In addition, and in terms of the stability of results over time, we see that the correlation 
between the efficiency scores increased, reaching around 0.9 in the periods 2012-2017 for both 
input and output oriented scores (while it was around 0.7 in the periods 2007-2012). 
4.3. Malmquist indices  
Table 3 reports the set of results for the Malmquist indices of efficiency, technology and 
TFP changes for the period 2007 to 2017, using Model 1 and 2 and assuming variable returns to 





The results show that between 2007 and 2017 there were increases in efficiency, notably in 
Model 1, with one input and two composite PSP outputs. However, the Malmquist indices show 
also an overall decrease in technology improvements, and also a reduction in TFP. In the case of 
Model 2, with two inputs (so-called opportunity and Musgravian related government spending) 
and the overall single composite PSP output, we find a decrease of both technical efficiency and 
technology, with again a drop in TFP. Therefore, in this OECD country sample, the mixture of 
inputs and processes, leading to lower efficiency, would flag the existence of room for overall 
improvements. 
5. Efficiency and Tax Structure Analysis 
5.1. Tax Patterns 
Data from taxation was retrieved from ICTD government revenue dataset (ICTD/UNU-
WIDER, 2018). These dataset combines data from different international sources under a standard 
classification system. For detailed information on the data construction, see Prichard et al. (2014) 
and McNabb (2017). 
[Figure 3] 
To better frame the empirical results, we review some stylized facts about OCDE’s taxation 
patterns and trends. Figure 3 shows the interquartile range over time of government revenue 
categories for all countries in our sample. We observe that, as a result of the global financial crisis 
and the need to consolidate after the stimulus package that many countries implemented to boost 
aggregate demand, total revenues (as a ratio to GDP) started increasing considerable. The rebound 
of economic activity as the recovery phase unfolded led to direct and indirect taxes to catch-up 
relative to pre-crisis levels. Also, as the labor market improved, social security contributions saw 




5.2. Second Stage Regression 
Exogenous and non-discretionary inputs, such as socio-economic characteristics or a 
particular relevant determinant - in our case the tax system structure -, can jointly contribute to 
each country’s efficiency score. We empirically assess the set of potential determinants, and most 
notably countries´ tax structures, of the previously computed set of public efficiency scores. The 
following reduced-form panel data specification is estimated: 
,  = -, + -. + /,01
2 -1 +  3,01′-5 + 6,     (7) 
where i denotes country, -. denotes region effects to control for geography-specific time invariant 
characteristics and -, denotes time (year) effects to control for global common shocks. 6,  is a 
disturbance term satisfying standard assumptions. 
Our dependent variable, ,, is the DEA input efficient scores, computed in the previous 
section. The input orientation scores are more suitable for this analysis, because they ensure that a 
given country’s efficiency is determined by its ability to minimize per capita expenditures to 
provide a fixed level of (public) services. Our set of variables of interest are included in vector /,, 
which comprises of several tax variables evaluated in percent of GDP. 3, is a vector of other 
sociodemographic, macroeconomic and institutional controls that may affect public sector 
performance. Both these vectors are lagged by one year to minimize reverse causality concerns. 
 As far as variables in vector /, are concerned, we study the role played by: i) total tax 
revenue (% GDP); ii) direct taxes (% GDP) defined as total direct taxes excluding social 
contributions but including resource taxes9; iii) taxes on income, profit and capital gains, including 




9 In other words, direct taxes nclude taxes on income, profits and capitals gains, taxes on payroll and workforce and 
taxes on property.  The total value of direct taxes may sometimes exceed the sum of these sub-components, owing to 




taxes on natural resource firms (% GDP)10; iv) personal income tax (% GDP) (pit)11; v) corporate 
income tax (% GDP) (cit), including taxes on resource firms; vi) payroll and workforce taxes (% 
GDP)12; vii) property taxes (% GDP); viii) indirect taxes (% GDP), which includes taxes on goods 
and services, taxes on international trade and other taxes (including resource revenues); ix) other 
taxes (% GDP); x) social security contributions (% GDP); and xi) non-tax revenues (% GDP), 
which comprises of data categorized as either “non-tax revenue” or “other revenue” or grants 
received by the government..  
In vector 3, we include: i) a proxy of country size, defined as the logarithm of domestic 
residents to control for the monitoring costs of government’s discretional behavior (Grossman et 
al., 1999); ii) a proxy of economic and technological development given by the number of internet 
users; iii) a measure capturing a reality exogenous to the government , and give by the share of 
tourism revenues in exports; iv) a couple of political variables identifying the incumbent 
government´s political ideology (either left or center, define as binary variables).13 Definitions and 
sources of all variables used in the second stage are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix A.  
Equation (7) was estimated for all countries considered using Simar and Wilson´s (2007) 
estimation approach. This method is described by the authors as a superior approach to alternatives 
such as OLS or censored (Tobit like) regressions. Such naïve estimators ignore that estimated DEA 
efficiency scores are calculated from a common sample of data and treating them as if they were 




10 Taxes may sometimes exceed the sum of individuals and corporations taxes, due to revenues that are unallocated 
between the two. 
11 This variable is always exclusive of resource revenues in available sources. 
12 This variable is entirely distinct from social contributions, though in underlying sources social contributions are very 
occasionally reported as payroll taxes. 
13 We also included other variables including institutional controls (checks and balances, measures of democratic 
quality) and proxies of human capital (number of yearsl of schooling, attainment and completion rates at the secondary 
level) but none yielded significant results. In addition, data availability constrained the sample further reducing the 




independent observations is not appropriate since the problems related to invalid inference due to 
serial correlation arise. Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure takes this (and other pitfalls) into 
account by constructing an underlying data generating process consistent with two-stage estimation 
implying a truncated regression model. 
Our main results from estimating Equation (7) using input DEA scores from Model 1 are 
displayed in Table 4. Looking at specification (1), we observe that on average both tax and non-
tax revenues reduce the level of efficiency, while the effect of social security contributions is not 
statistically different from zero. In particular, an increase of 1% of GDP in tax revenues leads to a 
1% decrease in the DEA efficiency score and in government spending efficiency. Going more 
granular lead us to specification (2) where we see that the negative tax revenue effect on 
government performance stems mainly from indirect taxes (the different between this coefficient 
estimate and that from direct taxes is statistically significant). By disaggregating further we now 
get the negative and significant result on social security contributions with a magnitude similar to 
that of direct taxes or non-tax revenues. In specifications (3) and (4) we try to further decompose 
revenue components but not much else is revealed simply confirming previous findings. The 
strongly stable and significant coefficient estimates on indirect taxes and social security 
contributions are reassuring as far as robustness is concerned. 
[Table 4] 
A brief comment on other regressors. Size seems to matter with larger countries typically 
being more efficient. Also, countries technologically more advanced have more efficient 
governments and also those that are able to attract more tourists (which also proxies for the weather 
and natural conditions, quality of institutions, public transportation and general services). Finally, 




in contrast with leftist parties where the coefficient estimate is consistently negative (even though 
statistically not different from zero).  
As a sensitivity exercise, we replaced the dependent variable in equation (7) by the input 
scores from Models 0 and 2. Results presented in Tables C.0 and C.1 in Appendix C show the 
strong negative influence of direct taxes, while now indirect taxes come out statistically 
insignificant in Model 2. In this case, specifications (3) and (4) are more revealing in the sense that 
both PIT and CIT seem to be the ones (out of direct taxes) driving the result in specification (2). 
Payroll and property taxes yield statistically insignificant coefficients (also not that the share of 
these components in tax revenues is considerably smaller). 
Our results are no too different when the analysis is performed using different estimation 
methods – Tobit and OLS regression with fixed effects. These estimation models show similar 
results to the Simar and Wilson´s (2007) estimation approach.   
Finally, instead of looking at input scores, in Table C.2 in Appendix C we rely on Model´s 
1 output scores and re-estimate Equation (7). As in Table 5, indirect taxes matter considerably by 
negatively affecting output efficiency scores. However, in contrast in Table 4, having an 
ideologically-centered government seems to lower government output performance. The same 
effect is true for larger and more developed countries. Consequently, there is a clear difference in 




We analyzed to what extent a country´s tax system relates to public spending efficiency in 




we computed DEA efficiency scores and Malmquist productivity indices. Secondly, we assess how 
the structure of taxes affects efficiency scores using a reduced-form panel data regression analysis.  
Our results can be summarized as follows: i) inputs can be theoretically lower by around 
32-34% in those years, keeping the same level of output; ii) between 2007 and 2017, there were 
efficiency gains for 47% of the countries; iii) between 2007 and 2017 there were some increases 
in efficiency, but the Malmquist indices show an overall decrease in technology and in TFP. 
Regarding the second step analysis, using Simar and Wilson’s algorithm, we find: iv) a negative 
direct tax effect on government performance; v) there is also a negative and significant effect from 
social security contributions with a magnitude similar to that of direct taxes or non-tax revenues; 
vi) and a negative impact on efficiency from indirect taxes, in this case with a higher magnitude 
than for the other tax items. 
Our findings carry some relevant messages for policy making. On the one hand, there is 
room for improvement in terms of government spending efficiency, with potential gains for the 36 
countries in our sample. On the other hand, the fact that several tax items have a different perceived 
negative effect on government spending efficiency, also adds relevant information notably for the 
budgetary authorities when choosing their respective tax structures and designing their tax policies, 
notably in the context of discretionary fiscal policy making. 
This study, however, does not come without its limitations. First, there is the issue of 
selecting inputs and outputs to compute efficiency scores and the selection of the set of control 
variables for the second-stage part of the analysis. Although such choice relied on the role of the 
government and other key variables previously evaluated in the literature, naturally a different set 
of variables could have also been chosen. The same applies to the set of control variables in the 
second-stage estimation (there could be an omitted variable bias problem that we tried, to the best 




different and countries were affected in a different manner.  Between 2008 and 2012, countries 
faced the outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis, nevertheless some countries were 
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Figure 1 – Malmquist TFP 
 
 
The DMU (country) produces less than feasible under each period’s production frontier. The MPI indicates the 
potential rise in productivity as the frontier shifts from period t to t+1. The country at time t could produce output yp 
for input xt;. With the same input xt it could produce output yq at period t+1. EC, efficiency change; TC, technology 











Figure 2 – Production Possibility Frontiers (2003-2007 and 2013-2017), Model 0 








Figure 2 plots the production possibility frontiers for Model 0 and periods 2003-2007 and 2013-2017.  AUS – Australia; AUT- 
Austria; BEL – Belgium; CAN – Canada; CHE – Switzerland; CHL – Chile; CZE – Czech Republic; DEU – Germany; DNK – 
Denmark; ESP – Spain; EST – Estonia; FIN – Finland; FRA – France; GBR – United kingdom; GRC – Greece; HUN – Hungary; 
IRL – Ireland; ISL – Iceland; ISR – Israel; ITA – Italy; JPN – Japan; KOR – South Korea; LTU – Lithuania; LUX – Luxembourg; 
LVA – Latvia; MEX – Mexico; NLD – Netherlands; NOR – Norway; NZL – New Zealand; POL – Poland; PRT – Portugal; SVK 













































































































Figure 3 - Interquartile Range of Government Revenues (ratio to GDP) 
a) Total Revenues b) Direct Taxes 
c) Indirect Taxes d) Social Security Contributions 
 
 
Note: Figure 3 plots the mean, median, top and bottom quartile of revenues´ distributions over time for the entire 





Table 1 – Total Public Sector Performance (PSP) Indicator (2003-2017) 
 
 
Sub Index  Variable 
Opportunity Indicators   
Administration  Corruption  
 Red Tape  
 Judicial Independence 
 Property Rights  
  Shadow Economy 
Education Secondary School Enrolment  
 Quality of Educational System 
  PISA scores 
Health Infant Survival Rate 
 Life Expectancy  
  CVD, cancer, diabetes or CRD Survival Rate 
Public Infrastructure Infrastructure Quality 
Standard Musgravian Indicators   
Distribution  Gini Index  
Stabilization  Coefficient of Variation of Growth  
  Standard Deviation of Inflation 
Economic Performance GDP per Capita 
 GDP Growth  




Table 2 – Summary of DEA   
 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
    2007 2012 2017 2007 2012 2017 2007 2012 2017 
Efficient  Number 3 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 






































Input Average 0.538 0.500 0.515 0.679 0.665 0.667 0.619 0.643 0.674 
 Median 0.462 0.449 0.468 0.674 0.643 0.634 0.539 0.597 0.643 
 Min 0.339 0.318 0.353 0.385 0.411 0.423 0.413 0.484 0.511 
 Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Stdev 0.195 0.186 0.174 0.200 0.168 0.17 0.179 0.15 0.132 
Output Average 1.169 6.396 1.461 1.102 1.161 1.159 1.163 6.359 1.442 
 Median 1.147 2.078 1.485 1.07 1.12 1.114 1.143 2.047 1.452 
 Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Max 1.519 152.000 2.354 1.393 1.427 1.408 1.519 151.626 2.345 
  Stdev 0.127 24.974 0.264 0.105 0.13 0.129 0.13 24.917 0.274 
 
Note: summary of the DEA results for the periods 2003-2007, 2008-2012 and 2013-2017 using input and output-oriented models. Model 0 uses one input, 
governments’ normalized total spending and one output, the total PSP. Model 1 uses one input, governments’ normalized total spending and two outputs, the 
opportunity PSP and the “Musgravian” PSP scores. Model 2 assumes two inputs, governments’ normalized spending on opportunity and on “Musgravian” indicators 







Table 3 – Summary of Malmquist Indices 
 
 
  2007-2012 2012-2017 2007-2017 
    EC TC TFP EC TC TFP EC TC TFP 
Model 1 Average 1.112 0.925 1.031 0.960 1.018 0.978 1.060 0.929 0.983 
 Median 1.095 0.894 0.990 0.973 1.030 0.983 1.091 0.920 0.997 
 Min 0.775 0.893 0.793 0.657 0.938 0.649 0.705 0.904 0.715 
 Max 1.734 1.045 1.811 1.083 1.030 1.104 1.281 1.014 1.158 
  Stdev 0.163 0.051 0.188 0.081 0.023 0.088 0.111 0.025 0.089 
Model 2 Average 0.793 1.057 0.837 2.809 0.942 2.643 0.930 0.996 0.926 
 Median 0.780 1.066 0.819 1.162 0.940 1.092 0.932 1.002 0.933 
 Min 0.011 0.953 0.011 0.576 0.938 0.542 0.562 0.960 0.563 
 Max 1.616 1.066 1.690 56.883 1.010 53.491 1.249 1.002 1.251 
  Stdev 0.321 0.022 0.338 9.277 0.012 8.724 0.160 0.013 0.158 
 
Note: summary of the Malmquist Indices for the periods 2007-2012, 2012-2017 and 2007-2017. Model 1 uses one 
input, governments’ normalized total spending and two outputs, the opportunity PSP and the “Musgravian” PSP scores. 
Model 2 assumes two inputs, governments’ normalized spending on opportunity and on “Musgravian” indicators and 






Table 4 – Second Stage Regression DEA Efficiency Model 1 
 
 Regressors \ specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 -0.922***    
 (0.181)    
Direct taxes (% GDP), t-1  -0.443**   
  (0.214)   
Taxes income, profit capital (% GDP), t-1   -0.492*  
   (0.275)  
pit (% GDP), t-1    -0.417 
    (0.316) 
cit (% GDP), t-1    -0.622 
    (1.050) 
Payroll taxes (% GDP), t-1   -0.625 -0.652 
   (0.930) (0.938) 
Property taxes (% GDP), t-1   -1.102 -1.142 
   (1.049) (1.059) 
Indirect taxes  (% GDP), t-1  -2.141*** -2.124*** -2.209*** 
  (0.509) (0.505) (0.513) 
Other taxes (% GDP), t-1  -0.290 -0.325 -0.134 
  (0.663) (0.685) (1.272) 
SSC (% GDP), t-1 -0.167 -0.518** -0.969*** -0.907*** 
 (0.234) (0.248) (0.276) (0.289) 
Non-tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 -0.647** -0.565* -0.581* -0.603* 
 (0.311) (0.330) (0.323) (0.340) 
Population (log), t-1 0.017*** 0.010 0.012* 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Internet users, t-1 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left political orientation, t-1  -0.016 -0.024 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Center political orientation., t-1  0.107*** 0.093*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Sigma 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients from Equation (7) using Simar and Wilson two-stage efficiency 
regression model. The dependent variable is the DEA input scores between 2007 and 2017 using Model 1. The 
definition and sources of the independent variables are presented in Table A.3 of Appendix A.  Five regions and year 
fixed effects are included but not reported for reasons of parsimony. Constant term also omitted. ***, **, * denote 







Appendix A – Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Table A.1: Output Components 
 
 
Sub Index  Variable  Source  Series 
Opportunity Indicators 
  
    
Administration  Corruption  Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) (2003- 2017) 
Average (5y) corruption on a scale from 10 
(Perceived to have low levels of corruption) to 0 
(highly corrupt), for the period 2003-2011; 
Average (5y) corruption on a scale from 100 
(Perceived to have low levels of corruption) to 0 
(highly corrupt), for the period 2012-2017.  
Red Tape  World Economic Forum:  
The Global competitiveness 
Report (2006-2017) 
Average (5y) burden of government regulation 
on a scale from 7 (not burdensome at all) to 1 
(extremely burdensome).  
Judicial 
Independence 
World Economic Forum:  
The Global competitiveness 
Report (2006-2017) 
Average (5y) judicial independence on a scale 
from 7 (entirely independent) to 1 (heavily 
influenced).  
Property Rights  World Economic Forum:  
The Global competitiveness 
Report (2006-2017) 
Average (5y) property rights on a scale from 7 
(very strong) to 1 (very weak). 




Average (5y) shadow economy measured as 





World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(2006-2017) 






World Economic Forum:  
The Global competitiveness 
Report (2006-2017) 
Average (5y) quality of educational system on a 
scale from 7 (very well) to 1 (not well at all). 
  PISA scores PISA Report (2003, 2006, 
2009, 2012, 2015) 
Simple average of mathematics, reading and 
science scores for the years 2015, 2012, 2009; 
Simple average of mathematics and reading for 
the year 2003. 
Health Infant Survival 
Rate 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(2006-2017) 
Average (5y) infant survival rate  
Infant survival rate = (1000-IMR)/1000. IMR is 
the infant mortality rate measured per 1000 lives 
birth in a given year.  
Life Expectancy  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(2006-2017) 
Average (5y) life expectancy at birth, measured 
in years. 
  CVD, cancer, 
diabetes or CRD 
Survival Rate 
World Health Organization, 
Global Health Observatory 
Data Repository (2000, 
2005, 2010, 2015, 2016) 
Average (5y) of CVD, cancer and diabetes 
survival rate. Survival Rate CVD, cancer and 
diabetes=100-M. M is the mortality rate 





World Economic Forum:  
The Global competitiveness 
Report (2006-2017) 
Average (5y) infrastructure quality on a scale 






Standard Musgravian Indicators  
 
  
Distribution  Gini Index  Eurostat, OECD (2003-
2016) (b) 
Average (5y) gini index on a scale from 
1(perfect inequality) to 0 (perfect equality). 
Transformed to 1-Gini. 
Stabilization  Coefficient of 
Variation of 
Growth  
IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO database) 
(2003-2017) 
Average (5y) coefficient of variation. 
Coefficient of variation=standard 
deviation/mean of GDP at constant prices 
(percent change). Reciprocal value 1/x 
  Standard 
Deviation of 
Inflation 
IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO database) 
(2003-2017) 
Standard deviation (5y) of inflation, consumer 
prices (percent change). Reciprocal value 1/x  
Economic 
Performance 
GDP per Capita IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO database) 
(2003-2017) 
Average (5y) GDP per capita based on PPP, 
current international dollar 
 
GDP Growth  IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO database) 
(2003-2017) 
Average (5y) GDP, constant prices (percent 
change) 
  Unemployment  IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO database) 
(2003-2017) 
Average (5y) unemployment rate as a 
percentage of total labor force. Reciprocal value 
1/x 
  
(a) For Chile, Iceland, Israel, South Korea and Mexico, we use the data available in Medina and Schneider (2017). 






Table A.2: Input Components 
 
Sub Index Variable Source Series 
Opportunity Indicators 




IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO database) 
(1998-2012) 
Average (5y) general government 
final consumption expenditure (% 




UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics (1998-2012) (a) 
Average (5y) expenditure on 
education (% of GDP)  
Health 
Health 
Expenditure OECD database (1998-2012) 
Average (5y) expenditure on 
health (% of GDP)  
Public Infrastructure Public Investment 
European Commission, 
AMECO (1998-2012) (b) 
Average  (5y)  general  
government gross fixed capital 
formation (% of GDP) at current 
prices 
Standard Musgravian Indicators 




OECD database (1998-2013) 
(c) 
Average (5y) aggregation of the 





OECD database (1998-2013) 
(d) 
Average (5y) expenditure total 
expenditure (% of GDP)  
 
(a) From the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for Greece for the period between 
2006 and 2012, for Luxembourg for the period 1999 and 2003 and for the USA for the period 1998 and 2007. 
(b) We were not able to collect data on the following countries: Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Chile, 
Israel and South Korea. 
(c) From IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for Mexico for the period between 
1998 and 2000 and for New Zealand for the period 2004 and 2012. For Turkey, we retrieve data from 
European Commission, AMECO database. For Chile and Iceland, we were only able to collect data for the 
period between 2013 and 2016. For Mexico, we were only able to collect data for the period between 1995 
and 2000. For Turkey, we were only able to get data for the period between 2009 and 2015. We were not able 
to collect data for Canada. For Japan, we were only able to collect data for the period between 2005 and 2016. 
For New Zealand, we were only able to collect data for the period between 2004 and 2016. 
(d) From the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for Canada for the period 
between 1998 and 2012 and for New Zealand for the period 2009 and 2012. For Turkey, we retrieve data 
from European Commission, AMECO database. We were not able to collect data for Mexico. For Chile and 
Iceland, we were only able to collect data for the period between 2013 and 2016. For New Zealand, we were 
only able to collect data for the period between 2009 and 2016. For Japan, we were only able to collect data 




Table A.3 – Second-stage regression 
 
Variable Definition Source 




Direct taxes (% GDP), t-1 
Previous year total direct taxes, excluding social contributions but 
including resource taxes, as a percentage of GDP.  Includes taxes 
on income, profits and capital gains, taxes on payroll and workforce 
and taxes on property.  The total value of direct taxes may 
sometimes exceed the sum of these sub-components, owing to 
revenue that is unclassified among these sub-components. 
Taxes income, profit capital 
(% GDP), t-1 
Previous year total taxes on income, profits and capital gains, 
including taxes on natural resource firms, as percentage of GDP. 
The taxes may sometimes exceed the sum of individuals and 
corporations taxes, due to revenues that are unallocated between the 
two. 
pit (% GDP), t-1 
Previous year total income, capital gains and profit taxes on 
individuals, as a percentage of GDP.  This figure is always 
exclusive of resource revenues in available sources. 
cit (% GDP), t-1 
Previous year total income and profit taxes on corporations, 
including taxes on resource firms, as a percentage of GDP. 
Payroll taxes (% GDP), t-1 
Previous year total taxes on payroll and workforce, as a percentage 
of GDP.  This variable is entirely distinct from social contributions, 
though in underlying sources social contributions are very 
occasionally reported as payroll taxes. 
Property taxes (% GDP), t-1 Previous year total taxes on property as percentage of GDP. 
Indirect taxes  (% GDP), t-1 
Previous year total indirect taxes, including resource revenues. 
Includes taxes on goods and services, taxes on international trade 
and other taxes.  
Other taxes (% GDP), t-1 Previous year total other taxes, as percentage of GDP. 
SSC (% GDP), t-1 Previous year total social contributions, as a percentage of GDP. 
Non-tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 
Previous year total non-tax revenue as percentage of GDP. 
Comprises data categorized as either “non-tax revenue” or “other 
revenue” or grants received by the government. 
Population (log), t-1 





Internet users, t-1 





Tourism revenues (% exports), 
t-1 





Left political orientation, t-1  
Dummy variable equal one if the government is from the left 




Center political orientation., t-
1  
 Dummy variable equal one if the government is from the center 









Appendix B – DEA Efficiency Scores 
 
Table B.0 – Input and Output-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores for Model 0 
 
 Input Output 
  2007 2012 2017 2007 2012 2017 
AUS 0.594 1.000 0.684 1.111 1.000 1.110 
AUT 0.374 0.373 0.388 1.152 1.930 1.517 
BEL 0.391 0.388 0.391 1.242 2.044 1.562 
CAN 0.456 0.478 0.502 1.141 1.808 1.347 
CHE 0.551 0.555 0.624 1.115 1.620 1.215 
CHL 0.755 0.903 0.758 1.128 1.179 1.494 
CZE 0.473 0.417 0.466 1.173 2.494 1.532 
DEU 0.351 0.394 0.441 1.336 1.992 1.424 
DNK 0.339 0.318 0.379 1.168 2.156 1.304 
ESP 0.712 0.448 0.411 1.053 3.783 1.752 
EST 0.771 0.493 0.461 1.035 3.140 1.578 
FIN 0.393 0.353 0.357 1.132 2.298 1.610 
FRA 0.348 0.326 0.353 1.196 2.112 1.513 
GBR 0.560 0.450 0.470 1.125 2.242 1.429 
GRC 0.440 0.395 0.377 1.201 152.000 2.354 
HUN 0.360 0.371 0.430 1.431 3.128 1.560 
IRL 0.681 0.481 1.000 1.088 2.793 1.000 
ISL 0.747 0.399 0.536 1.008 2.652 1.246 
ISR 0.396 0.571 0.549 1.291 1.358 1.327 
ITA 0.357 0.390 0.385 1.452 3.651 1.987 
JPN 0.618 0.465 0.482 1.076 2.224 1.483 
KOR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LTU 0.680 0.509 0.481 1.077 3.009 1.565 
LUX 0.690 0.406 0.506 1.037 1.983 1.266 
LVA 1.000 0.526 0.480 1.000 4.362 1.629 
MEX 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NLD 0.449 0.416 0.428 1.176 2.018 1.486 
NOR 0.382 0.414 0.448 1.198 1.789 1.361 
NZL 0.467 0.495 0.506 1.151 1.658 1.282 
POL 0.390 0.620 0.430 1.351 1.213 1.587 
PRT 0.366 0.394 0.390 1.519 3.659 1.727 
SVK 0.439 0.466 0.483 1.178 2.156 1.569 
SVN 0.397 0.391 0.394 1.227 2.967 1.662 
SWE 0.344 0.336 0.386 1.144 2.007 1.400 
TUR 0.529 0.574 0.619 1.247 1.809 1.381 
USA 0.558 0.495 0.552 1.128 2.035 1.338 
Count 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Average 0.538 0.500 0.515 1.169 6.396 1.461 
Median 0.462 0.449 0.468 1.147 2.078 1.485 
Min 0.339 0.318 0.353 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.519 152.000 2.354 







Table B.1 – Input and Output-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores for Model 1 
 
 Input Output 
  2007 2012 2017 2007 2012 2017 
AUS 0.908 1.000 0.856 1.017 1.000 1.025 
AUT 0.624 0.649 0.602 1.049 1.062 1.107 
BEL 0.564 0.583 0.582 1.122 1.140 1.147 
CAN 0.698 0.777 0.723 1.068 1.075 1.102 
CHE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CHL 0.786 0.991 1.000 1.090 1.008 1.000 
CZE 0.483 0.500 0.549 1.160 1.299 1.288 
DEU 0.623 0.650 0.659 1.076 1.094 1.104 
DNK 0.612 0.587 0.540 1.030 1.062 1.082 
ESP 0.781 0.574 0.585 1.041 1.226 1.221 
EST 0.828 0.637 0.634 1.031 1.195 1.208 
FIN 0.710 0.697 0.648 1.020 1.031 1.034 
FRA 0.542 0.542 0.520 1.085 1.104 1.139 
GBR 0.778 0.690 0.688 1.045 1.143 1.121 
GRC 0.451 0.434 0.423 1.195 1.401 1.408 
HUN 0.397 0.411 0.458 1.346 1.393 1.352 
IRL 0.750 0.691 1.000 1.041 1.161 1.000 
ISL 1.000 0.738 0.740 1.000 1.060 1.073 
ISR 0.456 0.584 0.634 1.193 1.198 1.193 
ITA 0.385 0.420 0.446 1.393 1.427 1.380 
JPN 0.849 0.797 0.770 1.032 1.094 1.084 
KOR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LTU 0.743 0.580 0.564 1.071 1.314 1.311 
LUX 0.864 0.679 0.717 1.027 1.086 1.068 
LVA 1.000 0.582 0.565 1.000 1.329 1.341 
MEX 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NLD 0.743 0.735 0.726 1.061 1.066 1.040 
NOR 0.557 0.575 0.631 1.103 1.137 1.115 
NZL 0.649 0.717 0.727 1.094 1.095 1.069 
POL 0.398 0.676 0.468 1.343 1.172 1.353 
PRT 0.449 0.506 0.571 1.229 1.225 1.200 
SVK 0.467 0.502 0.496 1.174 1.413 1.387 
SVN 0.404 0.485 0.483 1.218 1.263 1.312 
SWE 0.500 0.573 0.563 1.082 1.080 1.113 
TUR 0.561 0.579 0.640 1.218 1.334 1.258 
USA 0.874 0.796 0.814 1.028 1.100 1.094 
Count 5 4 5 5 4 5 
Average 0.679 0.665 0.667 1.102 1.161 1.159 
Median 0.674 0.643 0.634 1.070 1.120 1.114 
Min 0.385 0.411 0.423 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.393 1.427 1.408 








Table B.2 – Input and Output-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores for Model 2 
 
 Input Output 
  2007 2012 2017 2007 2012 2017 
AUS 0.612 1.000 0.702 1.075 1.000 1.099 
AUT 0.469 0.559 0.591 1.152 1.930 1.517 
BEL 0.507 0.579 0.602 1.242 2.044 1.562 
CAN 0.491 0.590 0.627 1.141 1.808 1.338 
CHE 0.573 0.644 0.716 1.103 1.620 1.208 
CHL 0.787 1.000 1.000 1.106 1.000 1.000 
CZE 0.533 0.553 0.629 1.173 2.494 1.521 
DEU 0.507 0.619 0.636 1.336 1.992 1.424 
DNK 0.421 0.484 0.511 1.168 2.156 1.304 
ESP 0.739 0.616 0.650 1.053 3.783 1.751 
EST 0.920 0.626 0.629 1.016 3.140 1.565 
FIN 0.486 0.545 0.575 1.132 2.298 1.610 
FRA 0.430 0.492 0.539 1.196 2.112 1.513 
GBR 0.678 0.680 0.673 1.125 2.158 1.424 
GRC 0.515 0.565 0.652 1.201 151.626 2.345 
HUN 0.509 0.546 0.670 1.431 3.128 1.550 
IRL 0.709 0.633 1.000 1.054 2.793 1.000 
ISL 0.990 0.491 0.579 1.002 2.652 1.226 
ISR 0.475 0.604 0.660 1.291 1.358 1.316 
ITA 0.544 0.608 0.668 1.452 3.651 1.973 
JPN 0.671 0.644 0.684 1.072 2.224 1.482 
KOR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LTU 0.688 0.670 0.685 1.071 2.935 1.560 
LUX 0.715 0.563 0.674 1.037 1.983 1.260 
LVA 1.000 0.692 0.692 1.000 4.262 1.623 
MEX 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NLD 0.534 0.564 0.574 1.176 2.018 1.480 
NOR 0.433 0.515 0.559 1.198 1.789 1.355 
NZL 0.473 0.547 0.571 1.142 1.658 1.263 
POL 0.589 0.758 0.625 1.351 1.213 1.581 
PRT 0.468 0.557 0.622 1.519 3.659 1.727 
SVK 0.526 0.691 0.723 1.178 2.050 1.566 
SVN 0.492 0.569 0.606 1.227 2.967 1.662 
SWE 0.413 0.494 0.517 1.144 2.007 1.400 
TUR 0.741 0.871 0.817 1.226 1.508 1.381 
USA 0.645 0.572 0.622 1.063 1.912 1.317 
Count 3 4 4 3 4 4 
Average 0.619 0.643 0.674 1.163 6.359 1.442 
Median 0.539 0.597 0.643 1.143 2.047 1.452 
Min 0.413 0.484 0.511 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.519 151.626 2.345 












Appendix C – Second Stage Regression  
 
Table C.1 – DEA Input Efficiency Scores for Model 0 
 Regressors \ specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 -1.109***    
 (0.155)    
Direct taxes (% GDP), t-1  -0.885***   
  (0.208)   
Taxes income, profit capital (% GDP), t-1   -1.139***  
   (0.261)  
pit (% GDP), t-1    -1.243*** 
    (0.302) 
cit (% GDP), t-1    -0.967 
    (0.922) 
Payroll taxes (% GDP), t-1   -0.653 -0.567 
   (0.879) (0.909) 
Property taxes (% GDP), t-1   -0.690 -0.736 
   (1.032) (0.996) 
Indirect taxes  (% GDP), t-1  -1.305*** -1.183*** -1.128*** 
  (0.381) (0.386) (0.406) 
Other taxes (% GDP), t-1  0.807 0.961 0.827 
  (0.629) (0.638) (1.113) 
SSC (% GDP), t-1 -0.305 -0.428* -1.411*** -1.403*** 
 (0.217) (0.227) (0.262) (0.273) 
Non-tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 -0.522* -0.713** -0.678** -0.677** 
 (0.280) (0.301) (0.298) (0.310) 
Population (log), t-1 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Internet users, t-1 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left political orientation, t-1  0.001 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Center political orientation., t-1  0.079*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Observations 99 99 99 99 
Sigma 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients from Equation (7) using Simar and Wilson two-stage efficiency 
regression model. The dependent variable is the DEA input scores for 2007, 2012 and 2017 using Model 0. The 
definition and sources of the independent variables are presented in Table A.3 of Appendix A.  Five regions and year 
fixed effects are included but not reported for reasons of parsimony. Constant term also omitted. ***, **, * denote 






Table C.2 – DEA Input Efficiency Scores for Model 2 
 Regressors \ specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 -0.946***    
 (0.170)    
Direct taxes (% GDP), t-1  -1.193***   
  (0.220)   
Taxes income, profit capital (% GDP), t-1   -1.425***  
   (0.279)  
pit (% GDP), t-1    -1.499*** 
    (0.322) 
cit (% GDP), t-1    -1.793* 
    (1.081) 
Payroll taxes (% GDP), t-1   -1.484 -1.371 
   (0.938) (0.965) 
Property taxes (% GDP), t-1   -0.324 -0.223 
   (1.115) (1.086) 
Indirect taxes  (% GDP), t-1  -0.115 0.033 0.030 
  (0.402) (0.410) (0.434) 
Other taxes (% GDP), t-1  0.751 0.860 1.286 
  (0.668) (0.680) (1.276) 
SSC (% GDP), t-1 -0.095 -0.013 -1.244*** -1.205*** 
 (0.238) (0.240) (0.279) (0.290) 
Non-tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 -0.922*** -1.046*** -0.999*** -0.996*** 
 (0.315) (0.325) (0.325) (0.336) 
Population (log), t-1 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Internet users, t-1 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left political orientation, t-1  -0.017 -0.020 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Center political orientation., t-1  0.074*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.083*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 97 97 97 97 
Sigma 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 







Table C.3 – DEA Output Efficiency Scores for Model 1 
 Regressors \ specification (2) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 -0.155    
 (0.234)    
Direct taxes (% GDP), t-1  -0.599**   
  (0.258)   
Taxes income, profit capital (% GDP), t-1   -0.807**  
   (0.338)  
pit (% GDP), t-1    -1.016*** 
    (0.372) 
cit (% GDP), t-1    -0.146 
    (1.301) 
Payroll taxes (% GDP), t-1   -1.996 -1.844 
   (1.308) (1.284) 
Property taxes (% GDP), t-1   1.773 1.783 
   (1.320) (1.319) 
Indirect taxes  (% GDP), t-1  1.519** 1.636*** 1.756*** 
  (0.634) (0.628) (0.619) 
Other taxes (% GDP), t-1  1.137 1.221 0.560 
  (0.986) (1.001) (1.567) 
SSC (% GDP), t-1 0.432 0.771** 0.128 0.049 
 (0.341) (0.329) (0.341) (0.359) 
Non-tax revenue (% GDP), t-1 0.650 0.339 0.331 0.342 
 (0.438) (0.444) (0.415) (0.425) 
Population (log), t-1 -0.021** -0.013 -0.017* -0.015* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Internet users, t-1 -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left political orientation, t-1  0.002 0.002 0.015 0.015 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Center political orientation., t-1  -0.124*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.109*** 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Sigma 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 









Online Appendix – Malmquist Efficiency, Technology and Total Factor Productivity 
Change Indices 
 
Table OA.1 – VRS Malmquist Indices for Model 1 
 
 2007-2012 2012-2017 2007-2017 
  EC TC TFP EC TC TFP EC TC TFP 
AUS 1.562 1.024 1.598 0.736 0.964 0.709 1.149 0.926 1.064 
AUT 1.147 0.894 1.025 0.959 1.030 0.988 1.100 0.920 1.013 
BEL 1.101 0.894 0.984 0.951 1.030 0.979 1.047 0.920 0.963 
CAN 1.187 0.894 1.061 0.942 1.030 0.970 1.118 0.920 1.029 
CHE 1.127 0.894 1.007 1.045 1.030 1.076 1.177 0.920 1.083 
CHL 1.235 0.916 1.131 0.927 1.004 0.931 1.145 0.912 1.044 
CZE 1.014 0.917 0.930 1.019 1.030 1.049 1.033 0.920 0.951 
DEU 1.151 0.894 1.028 1.003 1.030 1.033 1.154 0.920 1.062 
DNK 1.106 0.894 0.988 0.941 1.030 0.969 1.040 0.920 0.957 
ESP 0.987 0.938 0.926 0.913 1.030 0.940 0.902 0.936 0.844 
EST 1.042 0.972 1.013 0.885 1.030 0.911 0.922 0.961 0.886 
FIN 1.109 0.894 0.991 0.953 1.030 0.981 1.057 0.920 0.973 
FRA 1.091 0.894 0.975 0.956 1.030 0.985 1.044 0.920 0.961 
GBR 0.980 0.894 0.876 0.929 1.030 0.957 0.910 0.920 0.838 
GRC 0.955 0.923 0.881 0.942 1.030 0.970 0.899 0.925 0.832 
HUN 1.033 0.894 0.923 1.081 1.021 1.104 1.117 0.913 1.020 
IRL 1.036 0.893 0.924 0.975 0.977 0.953 1.010 0.971 0.980 
ISL 1.106 0.894 0.989 1.034 1.027 1.062 1.144 0.910 1.041 
ISR 1.301 1.024 1.332 0.985 0.974 0.959 1.281 0.904 1.158 
ITA 1.099 0.894 0.982 1.012 1.030 1.042 1.112 0.920 1.023 
JPN 1.174 0.894 1.050 0.943 1.030 0.971 1.107 0.919 1.017 
KOR 1.000 1.022 1.022 1.000 0.938 0.938 1.000 0.993 0.993 
LTU 0.920 1.006 0.926 0.905 1.030 0.932 0.833 0.985 0.820 
LUX 1.077 0.894 0.963 1.038 1.030 1.069 1.119 0.906 1.013 
LVA 0.775 1.024 0.793 0.909 1.030 0.937 0.705 1.014 0.715 
MEX 1.027 0.893 0.917 1.000 1.014 1.014 1.027 0.904 0.928 
NLD 1.079 0.894 0.965 0.975 1.030 1.004 1.052 0.920 0.968 
NOR 1.132 0.894 1.012 1.024 1.030 1.054 1.160 0.920 1.067 
NZL 1.139 0.894 1.018 0.972 1.030 1.001 1.107 0.920 1.019 
POL 1.734 1.045 1.811 0.657 0.989 0.649 1.139 0.915 1.042 
PRT 1.091 0.894 0.975 0.997 1.030 1.027 1.088 0.920 1.001 
SVK 1.078 0.953 1.027 0.980 1.019 0.999 1.056 0.938 0.990 
SVN 1.173 0.894 1.048 0.934 1.030 0.962 1.095 0.907 0.993 
SWE 1.185 0.894 1.059 0.993 1.030 1.023 1.176 0.920 1.083 
TUR 1.037 0.992 1.029 1.083 0.980 1.061 1.123 0.951 1.068 
USA 1.041 0.894 0.930 0.980 1.030 1.010 1.021 0.920 0.939 
Average 1.112 0.925 1.031 0.960 1.018 0.978 1.060 0.929 0.983 
Median 1.095 0.894 0.990 0.973 1.030 0.983 1.091 0.920 0.997 
Min 0.775 0.893 0.793 0.657 0.938 0.649 0.705 0.904 0.715 
Max 1.734 1.045 1.811 1.083 1.030 1.104 1.281 1.014 1.158 









Table OA.2 – VRS Malmquist Indices for Model 2 
 
 2007-2012 2012-2017 2007-2017 
  EC TC TFP EC TC TFP EC TC TFP 
AUS 1.616 1.046 1.690 0.743 0.938 0.697 1.202 0.977 1.174 
AUT 0.875 1.066 0.933 1.029 0.940 0.968 0.900 1.002 0.902 
BEL 0.853 1.066 0.909 1.041 0.940 0.979 0.888 1.002 0.890 
CAN 0.933 1.066 0.994 1.081 0.940 1.017 1.008 1.002 1.011 
CHE 0.977 1.066 1.041 1.106 0.940 1.040 1.081 1.002 1.083 
CHL 1.128 1.046 1.180 0.791 0.939 0.743 0.892 0.967 0.863 
CZE 0.601 1.066 0.641 1.402 0.940 1.318 0.843 1.002 0.845 
DEU 1.006 1.066 1.073 1.099 0.940 1.033 1.106 1.002 1.108 
DNK 0.766 1.066 0.816 1.334 0.940 1.254 1.021 1.002 1.024 
ESP 0.381 1.066 0.406 1.734 0.940 1.631 0.660 1.002 0.661 
EST 0.515 1.039 0.536 1.468 0.939 1.379 0.757 0.988 0.748 
FIN 0.679 1.066 0.724 1.153 0.940 1.085 0.783 1.002 0.785 
FRA 0.797 1.066 0.849 1.170 0.940 1.100 0.932 1.002 0.934 
GBR 0.619 1.066 0.660 1.182 0.940 1.112 0.732 1.002 0.734 
GRC 0.011 1.066 0.011 56.883 0.940 53.491 0.607 1.002 0.609 
HUN 0.604 1.066 0.644 1.879 0.940 1.767 1.136 1.002 1.138 
IRL 0.508 1.066 0.541 2.149 0.940 2.021 1.091 1.002 1.094 
ISL 0.559 1.023 0.571 1.885 0.941 1.774 1.053 0.966 1.017 
ISR 1.450 1.066 1.546 0.861 0.940 0.810 1.249 1.002 1.251 
ITA 0.546 1.066 0.582 1.545 0.940 1.453 0.844 1.002 0.846 
JPN 0.772 1.066 0.823 1.205 0.940 1.133 0.930 1.002 0.931 
KOR 1.000 1.054 1.054 1.000 0.938 0.938 1.000 0.989 0.989 
LTU 0.493 1.066 0.526 1.482 0.940 1.393 0.731 1.002 0.732 
LUX 0.705 1.066 0.751 1.430 0.940 1.345 1.008 1.002 1.010 
LVA 0.272 1.066 0.290 2.068 0.940 1.945 0.562 1.002 0.563 
MEX 1.000 0.953 0.953 1.000 1.010 1.010 1.000 0.960 0.960 
NLD 0.757 1.066 0.806 1.058 0.940 0.995 0.800 1.002 0.802 
NOR 0.978 1.066 1.043 1.092 0.940 1.026 1.068 1.002 1.070 
NZL 0.997 1.040 1.037 1.040 0.938 0.975 1.036 0.975 1.010 
POL 1.474 1.066 1.571 0.576 0.940 0.542 0.849 1.002 0.851 
PRT 0.608 1.066 0.648 1.811 0.940 1.703 1.101 1.002 1.104 
SVK 0.883 1.066 0.941 1.083 0.940 1.018 0.956 1.002 0.958 
SVN 0.588 1.066 0.627 1.454 0.940 1.367 0.855 1.002 0.857 
SWE 0.838 1.066 0.893 1.147 0.940 1.079 0.961 1.002 0.963 
TUR 0.959 1.066 1.023 0.948 0.940 0.891 0.910 1.002 0.912 
USA 0.788 1.007 0.793 1.183 0.945 1.118 0.932 0.960 0.895 
Average 0.793 1.057 0.837 2.809 0.942 2.643 0.930 0.996 0.926 
Median 0.780 1.066 0.819 1.162 0.940 1.092 0.932 1.002 0.933 
Min 0.011 0.953 0.011 0.576 0.938 0.542 0.562 0.960 0.563 
Max 1.616 1.066 1.690 56.883 1.010 53.491 1.249 1.002 1.251 
Stdev 0.321 0.022 0.338 9.277 0.012 8.724 0.160 0.013 0.158 
 
 
 
